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We show that a simple evolutionary scheme, when applied to the minority game (MG), changes
the phase structure of the game. In this scheme each agent evolves individually whenever his wealth
reaches the specified bankruptcy level, in contrast to the evolutionary schemes used in the previous
works. We show that evolution greatly suppresses herding behavior, and it leads to better overall
performance of the agents. Similar to the standard non-evolutionary MG, the dependence of the
standard deviation σ on the number of agents N and the memory length m can be characterized by
a universal curve. We suggest a Crowd-Anticrowd theory for understanding the effect of evolution
in the MG.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex adaptive systems consist of agents using
adaptive strategies to compete for limited resources. As
changes in the global environment are induced by the
agents themselves, it is important to study dynamics
of such systems. The minority game (MG), proposed
by Challet and Zhang[1], is a prototypical agent-based
model that can be analyzed using the tools of statisti-
cal mechanics. The game captures some essential fea-
tures of complex adaptive systems in which agents with
limited information and rationality compete for limited
resources. A key question in the study of agent-based
models is, how evolution changes the behaviors of the
agents.
There have been a few studies on the effect of evo-
lution in the minority game. In the context of a sim-
ple evolutionary minority game, Johnson et al. found
that the agents universally self-segregate into two oppos-
ing extreme groups [3]. Hod and Nakar, on the other
hand, claimed that clustering of cautious agents emerges
in a “tough environment” where the penalty for losing is
greater than the reward for winning [4]. Chen et al. [5, 6]
derived a general formalism to understand the dynamical
mechanism for the transition from segregation to cluster-
ing. They found that the effective rate of evolution plays
an important role in determining the resulting steady-
state population distribution. These studies have focused
mainly on population distribution. Li et al. [7], on the
other hand, studied how evolution can help to improve
the overall performance of the agents in the original MG.
Starting from the adaptive MG proposed by Challet and
Zhang [1], Li et al. introduced an evolutionary scheme in
which all poorly performing agents evolve synchronously
at every τ = 10, 000 steps. Agents are ranked by their
gains, and those ranked at the bottom p percent (p=10%,
20%, 30%, 40%, etc) are forced to change their strate-
gies at these pre-specified steps. In order to make the
evolution process smooth, not all the agents ranked at
the bottom will change their strategies, but only 50% of
those (chosen randomly) have to do so. Those who are
chosen to evolve replace the current strategies with new
randomly picked ones. They reported that with evolu-
tion the performance is significantly better; but the phase
structure, characterized by the so called Savit curve [8],
remains similar to that of the original non-evolutionary
MG. A later study [9] based on a variant of the evolution-
ary scheme used in Ref. [7] led to a similar conclusion,
but with better overall performance of the agents.
When dealing with models of heterogeneous agent pop-
ulation, it makes sense to use an evolutionary scheme
in which agents evolve individually, instead of syn-
chronously at specified times. In this paper we adopt the
simple scheme used in the EMG [3], in which an agent
becomes bankrupted and is replaced whenever its accu-
mulated wealth is below a given threshold. With this
simple scheme we found that herding behavior has dis-
appeared when the memory length (m) is small, and the
Savit curve obtained is significantly different from that
of the original MG.
II. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Let us first briefly describe the minority game model.
The game concerns a population of N (odd number) het-
erogeneous agents with limited capabilities, who repeat-
edly compete to be in the minority group. After each
round the winners gain a point and the losers lose a point.
Each agent holds S strategies. Each strategy is a look-
up table listing the strategy’s prediction of the minority
group given the record of the most recent m minority
groups. There are total 22
m
number of possible strate-
gies, so the larger the value ofm, the greater the process-
ing power of the agents. Virtual points are accumulated
for each of the strategies the agent has, and he uses the
most successful strategy available to him. To include the
effect of evolution we assign wealth w to each agent; w
will increase/decrease by one when the agent wins/loses.
The agent will be replaced if his wealth is below a thresh-
old −d (d > 0); the new agent chooses his S strategies
randomly and his wealth is initialized to zero. The dis-
tribution of strategies gradually evolves as the game goes
22m/N
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FIG. 1: σ2/N vs 2m/N for the MG with and without evo-
lution. d = 256 is used for the evolutionary MG. The results
are obtained by averaging over eight independent runs
on.
We have done extensive simulations with N =
51, 101, 201, 401; m = 1, 2, · · · , 10; S = 1, 2; and d =
4, 16, 64, 256, 1024, 4096. The number of time steps used
is set to be T0 = 800000×2
m/2+10000d; we have checked
that this choice of the time step is sufficient for obtain-
ing steady-state properties of the model. In our simula-
tions we monitor σ, which is the standard deviation of
the number of agents belonging to one of the groups. The
smaller the value of σ, the larger a typical minority group
and the better the overall performance of the agents will
be. The smallest value of σ is σ = 0.5, which means that
the difference between the numbers in the minority and
majority groups is one. The overall performance of the
agents is at the optimal when σ = 0.5. At the other ex-
treme, when the agents make their choices randomly as
in the random choice game (RCG), we have σ2/N = 0.25.
In almost all our simulations, particularly for small m,
evolution reduces σ significantly. This is illustrated in
Fig. 1, which shows σ2/N vs 2m/N for the MG with and
without evolution. The results are based on averages over
eight independent runs, which are enough for obtaining
accurate averages for the evolutionary MG, as the differ-
ences among different runs are quite small. For small m
evolution leads to a dramatic reduction in σ as herding
behavior of the agents is greatly suppressed. The results
for different N fall to a universal curve. For large m
the game still approaches the limit corresponding to the
random choice game and the effect of evolution is small.
We have also studied the model with the award-to-
fine ratio (as defined in Ref. [4]) R 6= 1. In this case
the winners get R points while the losers lose a point.
We found that, for each N , there is an optimal value of
R = Rc(N) > 1 that gives rise to the smallest value of σ.
For R > Rc(N) the average wealth is ever increasing and
there is no steady state. Fig. 2 shows σ2/N vs 2m/N for
R > 1 as compared to the case R = 1. It is clear from
2m/N
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FIG. 2: σ2/N vs 2m/N for the evolutionary MG. d = 64
is used. The results are obtained by averaging over eight
independent runs
the figure that σ can be further reduced when R > 1.
We also found that, for m = 1 or 2, the optimal value of
σ = 0.5 can in fact be achieved.
III. A CROWD-ANTICROWD THEORY FOR
THE EVOLUTIONARY MG
We now consider a Crowd-Anticrowd theory [10] to
understand the effect of evolution in the minority game.
Our discussion below follows Ref. [10]. For simplicity we
only consider S = 1 and use a reduced strategy space
(RSS). Numerically the differences between the cases
with S = 1 and S = 2 are small. RSS is a subset of
strategies, which span the full strategy space (FSS). Con-
sider, for example, an RSS for m = 2, consisting of the
following eight strategies:
U ≡ {−1− 1− 1− 1}, {+1+ 1− 1− 1}, {+1− 1 + 1− 1}, {−1+ 1 + 1− 1} (1)
U¯ ≡ {+1+ 1 + 1 + 1}, {−1− 1 + 1 + 1}, {−1 + 1− 1 + 1}, {+1− 1− 1 + 1} (2)
Here ±1 indicate the prediction of a strategy given one
of the four possible histories. Any two strategies in {U ,
U¯} are either uncorrelated (with the Hamming distance
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FIG. 3: Histogram for the number of appearances of all possi-
ble histories. N = 101, S = 2, m = 6, and d = 256. For com-
parison the corresponding histogram for the non-evolutionary
MG is also plotted
2m/2) or anti-correlated (with the largest Hamming dis-
tance 2m). For a given m there are total 2P (P = 2m)
strategies with P pairs of anti-correlated strategies (other
pairs are uncorrelated) in RSS. For each strategy G in
RSS there is a corresponding anti-correlated strategy G¯.
It is believed that the essential features of the game are
kept when RSS is used instead of the FSS [2].
Let us evaluate σ2 =< (n+(t)−N/2)
2 >t=< (n+(t)−
n−(t))
2 > /4, where n+ and n− are the numbers of agents
making the choices +1 and −1 respectively. The average
is over time step t. In RSS
n+(t)− n−(t) =
2P∑
G=1
a
µ(t)
G nG,
where µ(t) denotes the current history, a
µ(t)
G = ±1 is the
response of strategy G to the history bit-string µ(t), and
nG is the number of agents using strategy G at time t.
We have
σ2 =
1
4
2P∑
G=1,G′=1
< a
µ(t)
G nGa
µ(t)
G′ nG′ >t . (3)
In our simulation we found that the system visits all pos-
sible histories equally. This is illustrated in Fig. 3, which
shows a histogram of the number of visits for each m-bit
history. In order to compare with the non-evolutionary
MG, we use S = 2 in the figure; the result for S = 1 is
essentially the same. As we can see from the figure, the
system does not visit all possible histories equally in the
non-evolutionary MG.
For the evolutionary MG we can thus replace an av-
erage over time by an average over all possible histo-
ries. Now the double sum can be broken down into
three parts, based on the correlation between the strate-
gies. Given < aGaG >t= 1, < aGaG¯ >t= −1, and
< aGaG′ >t≈< aGaG′ >h= 0 (for G
′ 6= G and G′ 6= G¯),
where < · · · >h indicates average over all possible histo-
ries, we can write the double sum as
σ2 =
1
4
[
2P∑
G=1
< n2G >t −
2P∑
G=1
< nGnG¯ >t
]
(4)
=
1
4
P∑
G=1
[
< n2G >t −2 < nGnG¯ >t + < n
2
G¯ >t
]
(5)
=
1
4
P∑
G=1
< (nG − nG¯)
2 >t (6)
In the above derivation we have tacitly assumed that
{nG} change very slowly so the averages over {aG} can be
done while holding {nG} constant. This is in the spirit of
adiabatic approximation; it is valid because the evolution
rate is low (as long as d is not too small).
Let nP be the number of pairs of agents holding anti-
correlated strategies and nS be the number of agents
holding unpaired strategies. Only the agents holding un-
paired strategies contribute to σ; the game behaves es-
sentially as an RCG with nS number of agents. Thus we
have σ2 = 0.25nS, or
σ2/N = 0.25s, (7)
where s = nS/N . Note that 2nP + nS = N , nP can be
written as nP = N(1− s)/2. To determine s we need to
consider the evolutionary dynamics of the game. At the
steady state we have the following balance equation
2rPnP (1− p(m,N)) = rSnSp(m,N), (8)
where rP and rS are the bankruptcy rate for the paired
agents (pair breaking rate) and the bankruptcy rate for
the unpaired agents respectively; p(m,N) is the proba-
bility that a new pair is formed when a bankrupted agent
is replaced. One can estimate p(m,N) as
p(m,N) = 1− (1−1/2P )nS ≈ 1−exp(−0.5Ns/2m) (9)
It is somewhat difficult to estimate rP and rS . It can be
argued that rP /rS does not sensitively depend on m and
N . The equation for s is then
rP
rS
(1− s) = s
p(s/z)
1− p(s/z)
, (10)
where z = 2m/N . The solution s is a function of z. Thus,
when we plot σ2/N vs z = 2m/N , the curves fall to a
universal curve. Since p(x) is a monotonically decreasing
function of x, the universal curve s(z) obtained from the
above equation will be a monotonically increasing func-
tion of z. In the limit z → ∞ we have p(s/z) → 0; this
leads to s→ 1 or σ2/N = 0.25. Thus z →∞ is the RCG
limit. For R > 1, rP /rS decreases; this leads to smaller
values for s and σ. All these are in agreement with the
simulation results. Thus the Crowd-Anticrowd picture
4provides a qualitative understanding of the evolutionary
MG.
In conclusion, we have shown that, when a simple evo-
lutionary scheme is applied to a heterogeneous popula-
tion of agents, herding behavior in the MG is greatly
suppressed. The dependence of the standard deviation
σ on the number of agents N and the memory length m
can be characterized by a universal curve. In addition,
we demonstrated that a Crowd-Anticrowd theory can be
used to understand qualitatively the effect of evolution
in the MG.
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